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Introduction 
In a recent paper, Bruce (2008) commences by stating, inter alia, that “Nicolette Priaulx, 
using legal reasoning argued that the British courts‟ ruling in these cases have been 
inconsistent and unsupportable. This paper takes the contrary view, arguing that the court‟s 
behaviour can be explained using economic reasoning.”2  Insofar as Bruce‟s fascinating 
paper raises a much broader range of issues of interest to me, it is this passage which 
captures my particular attention. In light of my earlier contribution to the Journal of Legal 
Economics (hereafter, “JLE”),3 which provides a lengthy critique of the recent developments 
in the wrongful conception/birth case law in the UK, in this note, here I seek to offer some 
thoughts in starting to address the following interrelated questions:  
(1) Why is it that Professor Bruce and I should find ourselves so profoundly in 
disagreement as to the British courts‟ management of these wrongful birth cases? 
What lies at the heart of this disagreement?  
(2) Should there really be a „disagreement‟ at all, if, as is it commonly claimed, that 
economists employ the „positive scientific‟ approach to investigate the rationale 
underlying the development of the common law?  
(3) Why do I find an economic analysis of the wrongful birth cases unconvincing? How 
could it convince me?  
It is important that I clarify at this stage that the discussion that follows is written not as a 
general attack upon economics or economic analyses of the law,4 or indeed for that matter, 
upon the extremely interesting paper that Chris Bruce has offered. Rather, my response is 
posed largely as a query. My hope is that the combination of Bruce‟s paper and my own will 
encourage others to share a fruitful dialogue about the field of economics, as well as its 
relationship to other approaches to the study and understanding of the law. 
Legal Reasoning (& the View from ‘Somewhere Else’) 
First things first: one of the assumptions underpinning Bruce‟s paper is that I take issue with 
the British courts‟ rulings in the actions for wrongful conception and birth based on „legal 
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reasoning‟. In part, this is true. Certainly a significant portion of my prior contribution to JLE 
was spent exploring fairly doctrinal concerns, that is evaluating the „law‟ (intended here to 
mean in its very narrowest sense the strict application of the elements of the tort of 
negligence in establishing liability, notably: duty, breach and causation of damage) more or 
less as a technical matter, in order to assess whether on this ground, the overall reasoning 
of the courts could be said to be both consistent and convincing. My view, based on this 
narrow doctrinal concern was that the (legal) reasoning deployed by the appellate courts in 
the wrongful birth saga running from McFarlane v Tayside Health Board5 to the House of 
Lords‟ final holding in Rees v Darlington Memorial Hospital6 was inconsistent, at points, 
contradictory, and on the whole, deeply unconvincing.7 This is a fairly unremarkable 
conclusion, and I am by no means alone in holding this view.8  
However, that was only the first part of my analysis, and it was not the most critical part of it. 
That the deployment of the „legal rules‟ proved to be both inconsistent and unconvincing was 
not, per se, the problem for me; „legal reasoning‟ fails to provide a sufficient explanation as 
to why it is that I believe the overall outcomes in these cases to be unsupportable (just as it 
is nigh impossible to explain the courts‟ conclusions reached in these cases purely by 
reference to legal principle). This is a critical point.  
Rather, the notion that the approach of the courts is unsupportable is grounded in what one 
could call the “View from Somewhere Else” (rather than the pure application of legal rules) – 
that is, some other principles, concerns, biases and values are coming into play, and have 
influenced my view that the decision-making of the courts in these cases cannot be 
supported. To make this clearer, let‟s place this in context. It is entirely plausible that one 
can find the technical application of the legal rules to be both inconsistent and unsound, but 
nevertheless still support the overall conclusion. One might put the wrong ingredients into a 
bowl, or perhaps the right ones but in the wrong order, and still end up with a jolly nice cake 
agreeable to one‟s palate. And the same can be said in particular instances of the law - one 
can support the overall policy conclusions reached even if one is critical of the manner by 
which the courts have arrived at them.9   
Yet, as one can see clearly in the context of these wrongful birth cases, „policy‟ refers to the 
question as to what direction the law ought to take – e.g. the normative question as to 
whether the repercussions of parenting an unwanted but healthy child should form the 
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 If one is looking for solid legal reasoning which strictly applies the various tenets of McFarlane, the 
most coherent/consistent legal response would be to deny all parents (whether healthy or disabled) of 
wrongfully conceived children (whether healthy or disabled) access to both child maintenance 
damages and the so-called „conventional award‟. For fuller details as to why I hold the view that the 
law in this area is inconsistent, contradictory and unconvincing, based on „legal reasoning‟, see my 
previous contribution to this journal, Priaulx (2008).  
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case law in this field demonstrates a certain about of stumbling from one set of facts to the next and 
that this creates (and has created) „a formula for confusion and instability in the law”. Hoyano‟s view 
(2002:900) is in tune with this, and in her beautiful and thorough critique of the development of the 
case law in this field she argues that the case law in this field illustrates „how far negligence law has 
come adrift of principle‟. See also the critiques of Morris (2004); Lunney (2004); Jackson (2001).   
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subject-matter of damages. But the point is this: the particular policy direction that the law 
takes on this matter is a choice, a judg(e)ment – it is not a purely technical concern which 
automatically springs from the internal logic of the law/legal rules/legal reasoning. Such a 
view is made apparent from a reading of McFarlane (in which their Lordships spoke in „five 
different voices‟, deploying different legal mechanisms and moral justifications by which to 
deny parents of unwanted but healthy children damages for child maintenance) and 
subsequent cases, and indeed, as Lady Justice Hale (as she was then – now Baroness 
Hale) recognised, the reasoning of the judges in McFarlane was explicitly shaped by 
reference to broader considerations/policy concerns:  
[A]t the heart of their reasoning was the feeling that to compensate for the 
financial costs of bringing up a healthy child is a step too far. All were concerned 
that a healthy child is generally regarded as a good thing rather than a bad thing 
(Hale, 2001: 755).  
So, just as „legal reasoning‟ fails to fully explicate the basis of their Lordships‟ judgment in 
McFarlane, it will also fail to explain the basis for the view that the courts‟ management of 
these wrongful birth cases is worthy of support or not; to form the view that parents should or 
should not receive damages for the unwanted but healthy child (or indeed, the unwanted but 
disabled child for that matter) – is a choice, a judgment – based on a “View from Somewhere 
Else”, rather than a conclusion that can be formed via scientific observation of phenomena, 
or as arising naturally from the application of strict legal rules.  
That legal reasoning may not point in any clear direction in cases such as these, and that we 
must seek to identify what extra-legal principles, values and biases are shaping the law as a 
means of understanding its development, is made clear once one examines the dicta of the 
individual judges in the House of Lords in McFarlane and in Rees (as well as the 
conflicts/divisions between those judges), and of the different „solution‟ arrived at in relation 
to these cases by Lady Justice Hale in Parkinson. Moreover, this should be unsurprising – 
the very conceptual machinery used by the courts in fashioning their different „solutions‟ to 
these cases (e.g. in relation to the question of whether a duty of care is owed, „fair, just and 
reasonable‟) is inherently vague, open to differential interpretation and capable of masking 
policy considerations. Indeed, the concepts critical to establishing liability - of duty, breach 
and causation of damage - are not merely self-evident, objective and neutral categories that 
guide the judge in his „fact-finding mission‟ towards an objective resolution. Rather these 
concepts overlap and intersect; they are variable, interchangeable, policy-laden 
smokescreens, „open to judicial manipulation‟ (Conaghan and Mansell, 1999). So, as these 
instances make clear, „legal reasoning‟ cannot be a value-free, objective or „scientific‟ 
enterprise – even Lord Steyn himself noted in McFarlane that the „judges‟ sense of the moral 
answer to a question… has been one of the great shaping forces of the common law‟ (p. 82 
[my emphasis]). And indeed as a reading of McFarlane makes clear, what is at work in the 
development of the wrongful birth case law is not strict legal doctrine, but exceptions to 
doctrine – in other words, what underpins the various outcomes of all of these decisions is 
policy.10 
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Therefore, we must dig a little deeper, beyond the letter of the law, in order to establish 
whether the concerns that have shaped the courts‟ determination of these cases (e.g. the 
judges‟ sense of the moral answer to the question as to whether parents of unwanted, 
wrongfully born children should be entitled to compensation on ordinary principles of tort law) 
are sound, justifiable and supportable.  
Clashing Views? Normative versus Positive Analysis 
So, beyond legal reasoning then; in this regard, it is relevant to note that in analysing the 
(inconsistent) reasoning, the overall outcome (including the matter of what compensation is 
awarded and on what basis), and the question as to how the developments within this field 
cohere with the objectives of the law of tort generally (i.e. how tort law does tort law), I 
approach all of these issues from an explicitly feminist perspective. In my original 
contribution to JLE, perhaps I did not make that plain enough. Either way, this must surely 
constitute the right starting point for understanding why Chris Bruce and I would arrive at 
different conclusions regarding the courts‟ management of the wrongful birth cases: we are 
not really disagreeing about the handling of these wrongful birth cases – rather, what we are 
disagreeing about is the lens through which one should examine these actions in the first 
place. That lens – whether one deploys an economic lens, a „feminist‟ lens, or any other, will 
determine and limit the kinds of questions we ask and don’t ask, the aspects of the cases 
that we care about or don‟t, alongside shaping the nature of the conclusions we can and do 
reach. Each lens exposes its own methodological bias, holds different objectives and quite 
simply, embraces different ways of „knowing‟.  
In this sense, insofar as Chris Bruce and I appear to arrive at different conclusions in relation 
to these wrongful birth cases – what we are dealing with here is a much more fundamental 
sort of disagreement.11 While economists claim to be engaged in the practice of „positive 
science‟, the “what is” project („positive science does not concern itself with value judgments, 
or what should be‟), feminists by contrast are self-consciously engaged in a normative 
project – we have a vision of the kind of world that we think women ought to, need to and 
deserve to inhabit. As one might imagine, the difference between the “what is” and the “what 
ought to be” approaches to these actions is likely to provide the explanation for our 
difference of views as to whether or not the solution of the courts to the dilemma of the 
wrongfully born child is „supportable‟. I shall return to briefly explore this clash of normative 
versus positive analysis shortly insofar as I have some reservations as to whether an 
economic analysis of tort can truly present itself as a positivist methodology – and this is 
particularly so on my reading of Bruce‟s assertions on the point of wrongful birth case law; 
but before turning to this I would first like to briefly outline a few points as to my approach to 
these cases, for this exposes very quickly, why Chris Bruce and I might never find ourselves 
in agreement.  
A Brief Overview of a Feminist Approach to Wrongful Birth Claims 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
economic principles). In this sense, „strict law‟ is intended to mean the body of existing legal 
rules/doctrine, whilst legal policy is intended to refer to the variety of directions that the law could take.  
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As the most fleeting glance of the now numerous comments and articles exploring the case 
of the „unwanted child‟ reveal, claimants in the UK instituting such actions can expect to 
receive a significantly lower compensation package than would have been available prior to 
1999. In this sense, I suggest in JLE, as elsewhere (Priaulx, 2006) that these actions are „in 
decline‟. Departing from the principles of conventional justice, the courts have determined 
that parents complaining of the unwanted repercussions following a negligently born child 
should no longer be entitled to full compensation.12 Prior to McFarlane, the full compensation 
principle applied to what is, in effect, quite simply an action for clinical negligence. Although 
the post-McFarlane developments have been causative of celebratory cheers from some 
scholarly corners, I take a very different stance. From a feminist perspective, one that is 
rooted in protecting and promoting women‟s reproductive freedom, the demise of these 
actions was (and is) viewed as a cause for great concern. While not discounting the 
importance of men‟s contribution to child-rearing, it is nevertheless women who experience 
the biological processes of reproduction, and despite shifting (rather than shifted) attitudes 
towards women‟s role in public life, it remains the case that the responsibility of caretaking 
for children and others in society falls, more often than not, upon women.  
For these reasons, my exploration of these cases centralises its concern with the 
reproductive experiences of women and their lives before the law of tort. Changes in legal 
policy as to the injuries and harms the law is willing to acknowledge and protect when 
relating to matters of reproduction cannot be properly viewed or understood without specific 
reference to women – this is not an area of law that warrants a gender-neutral stance. Why 
should this be so you ask? Well, there are very practical reasons most obviously concerning 
the existing responsibility that women currently undertake for dependency work. Not only 
does this impose very clear financial limitations upon life, but can hinder a woman‟s 
aspirations for career, or education, among other opportunities open to men and childless 
women. While this imbalance is not something that can be generally tackled through the law 
of tort, it is a different matter when those responsibilities are thrust upon women by 
negligence. In this context, it is therefore of critical importance that the law of tort handles 
constructively, rather than reflects, the unequal nature of society. However, alongside this, 
the law of tort also holds significant symbolic power in three interlined ways. First, these 
actions hold the potential to reinforce that the negligent failure to protect women‟s 
reproductive choices constitutes a real harm, with significant and enduring repercussions 
upon their lives. The law can articulate that the harms that women suffer, as women, really 
matter. Second, the reproductive torts could enhance women‟s reproductive freedom by 
enforcing higher standards of medical care – liability for the frustration of women‟s choices 
sends out a strong signal that the medical profession should take greater care in their 
facilitation. Third, the law also plays an important role in reflecting the reality and diversity of 
women‟s lives. Although „choice‟ is a term inclined to mislead, in bespeaking an array of 
unlimited choices that is rarely there, it is nevertheless important to take seriously a woman‟s 
choice to avoid, or indeed, delay, parenthood to pursue other avenues, which she regards as 
more fulfilling in her life. The law does play an essential role in articulating that these 
interests are ones worthy of protection and the importance of reproductive autonomy in the 
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diverse lives of women (and of course men) as a means of leading a fulfilling and chosen 
life.  
In light of these points, my mission, if you will, was to assess the demise of the reproductive 
torts – to root out why it should be that the courts have assessed these actions as deserving 
„special treatment‟. And it is important to note that although the actions for wrongful 
conception and wrongful birth have been given special labels, they are no different in 
essence to any other case of medical negligence. But they have been singled out for special 
treatment.  
Yet in my evaluation of these actions, I did not seek to ask whether the courts‟ behaviour 
was in line with economic thought, nor did I seek to query what an „efficiency-seeking court 
would rule‟ in these cases (Bruce, 2008) – these were not my concerns. Instead I asked: to 
what extent had the above considerations, as to the specific impact that failed reproductive 
plans had on women, been taken (or not) into account in shaping the law‟s response that no 
longer should women harmed through negligence resulting in pregnancy, childbirth and the 
responsibilities of parenthood become the recipients of full compensation? What 
assumptions have informed legal principle that these kinds of injuries should be assessed as 
less deserving, less worthy of recognition than other kinds of injuries sustained in the clinical 
arena? Are these harms so different in nature from other kinds of injuries? How does the law 
understand those harms specifically sustained by women? As my work in this field has 
considered, the explanations offered by the courts (and indeed others commenting on this 
development in the reproductive torts) left many questions begging as to why the injuries 
sustained in these actions have been singled out and largely transformed from compensable 
harm into the mere vicissitudes of life.  
This fleeting insight into my approach readily reveals that my analytical concerns will 
dramatically depart from those of an economist studying this breed of clinical negligence. 
The matters which concern me, it would seem, are simply not relevant or of interest to a 
mainstream economist. I am explicitly engaged in the „how things ought to be‟ question – 
however, to some degree, I rather think the economist is too, despite his assertions to the 
contrary. And it is perhaps for that very reason that I find an economic analysis of the 
wrongful birth litigation unconvincing. Given that I hope for a rejoinder, let me expand on this 
a little.  
Economic Analysis of the Courts’ Behaviour: Explaining it, 
condoning it, or reflecting it? 
 
“…the court‟s behaviour can be explained using economic reasoning” (Bruce, 
2008) 
 “By analyzing merely “the way things are,” without foregrounding a concern 
for “the way things perhaps ought to be,” or for what initial allocations of 
wealth and/or power are secured by the way things are, Law and Economics 
provides a very powerful justification for maintenance of the current status 
quo. In such respects, it seems likely that rather than being a mere application 
DRAFT - DO NOTE CITE WITHOUT AUTHOR’S PERMISSION 
 
 
7 
 
of a logical scientific method to the law, Law and Economics could be seen as 
part of a normative approach to the law and to politics” (Dougherty, 2005: 6). 
“What this sequence of cases shows is that if the Law Lords… are to take their 
law-making function seriously… thy must, at least, be prepared to contemplate 
the possibility that it may be dangerous to consider individual cases too much 
in isolation and on their precise facts. … Stumbling from one set of facts to the 
next is, as Rees shows, a formula for confusion and instability in the law” 
(Cane, 2004: 190-1).  
These quotes foreground a few of my concerns with the economist‟s continued retention of 
the claims that he/she is engaged in positive science, that positive science does not concern 
itself with value judgments, or what should be and that this forms the basis of economic 
theory‟s ability to predict what will be (see Bruce, 2008). Insofar as I cannot seek to be 
comprehensive here (for this was supposed to be a „brief‟ response to Bruce‟s paper), I shall 
outline a number of concerns (and indeed queries) on this point.  
It is fully accepted that in our endeavours to understand “what is”, that we must all simplify or 
abstract from observations of the real world – the real world is indeed so complex that 
humans cannot be expected to understand it fully.13 Indeed, even in the narrower context of 
the common law, the same is true. As is clear from Cane‟s quote above, for those of us who 
endeavour to understand the development of the common law, and in particular, these 
wrongful birth cases, we are all trying to make sense of chaos. In these cases, the UK 
judiciary has quite literally, „stumbled‟ from one set of facts to the next. In McFarlane the 
House of Lords did not anticipate the unusual factual twist of Rees – they just didn‟t see it 
coming - and they paid scant attention to how, if at all, they might resolve the case of the 
disabled child.14 And this, as I suggested in my earlier contribution to JLE, has spawned very 
particular problems in terms of the legal reasoning that flows from these cases.  
However, our respective disciplines provide us with tools for attempting to make some sense 
of this chaos. Chris Bruce, for example, claims that the courts‟ behaviour can be explained 
using economic reasoning, whilst I claim, that an analysis which centralises gender also has 
explanatory force. From my analysis, the overall results of the courts‟ management of these 
cases, as discerned from the reasoning deployed by the judiciary, is premised upon very 
particular (and false) constructions of women, and that it is this fundamental 
misrepresentation of women‟s sexual and reproductive lives which provides one (albeit, 
pretty convincing) explanation for the decline in compensation that will be made available to 
parents of children wrongfully conceived as a result of medical misadventure. No doubt 
insights from psychology, sociology, philosophy, evolutionary biology and so on could 
provide us with alternative accounts – however, as things stand, the explanation offered by 
Chris Bruce and myself arguably constitute competing theories as to „what is‟, and to some 
extent, „what will be‟.  
However, while there are significant differences between our approaches, the real point of 
departure between us, and what I see as being the single chief weakness of economic 
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 Those simplifications and abstractions inevitably mean that for each of us, the explanation for „what 
is‟, is but one possible explanation amongst many. 
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method, is the refusal to concede (or perhaps a failure to realise) that when one seeks to 
understand the world through an economic lens, one is to some degree (perhaps a large 
degree, but this is moot) engaged in the question of „what should be‟. Economics is not a 
value-neutral enterprise.15 For example, the primary concern for „efficiency‟ it might be 
claimed, is positivist – that is, merely descriptive of the development of the common law. 
However, on the other hand, the question can be begged of Law and Economics as to 
whether, „efficiency‟ is the aim, the thing to be „promoted‟, the „ideal‟ (in which case, the 
approach is decidedly normative) - or whether it is claimed that „efficiency‟ merely constitutes 
the expected and rational/normal behaviour of individuals, entities, and indeed, courts (in 
which case, economics holds a closer relationship with psychology) and thereby provides a 
useful model for predicting behaviour. And from my „outsider‟ perspective, there would seem 
to be a great deal of slippage between the two. As Dougherty argues, “…it is bedevilling to 
try to grasp the difference between what is labelled positive and what is clearly normative in 
much of Law and Economics literature. Most of its positive arguments in fact are based on 
fundamental assumptions that clearly involve normative choices and political judgments 
(Dougherty, 2005: 4).  
This query keenly arises in relation to the paper offered by Chris Bruce – for even in his 
introduction it would not appear that his analysis of these wrongful birth cases is neutral. 
Insofar as Bruce points out that I regard the management of these cases by the British 
Courts to be unsupportable, he claims to take a contrary view – so, am I to assume from this 
that he supports the conclusion of the British courts on the basis that their approach is in line 
with economic reasoning? This demonstrates, I think, some slippage between positive and 
normative analysis. The answer I would expect from someone like Chris Bruce (and I am 
happy for him to qualify this for me), is not that he supports the overall outcomes of the 
cases, nor that he takes issue with what I say – but rather, that the Courts‟ behaviour is 
merely in line with economic principle, more or less in line with testable hypothesis which 
flow from economic principle. If „efficiency‟ is not an ideal, a goal – in the normative sense – 
it should not matter one jot whether the result I suggest (which may well be seen by an 
economist to be inefficient) – is actually the overall result that the courts do reach. To an 
economist who is engaged in the work of positive science, this would merely be an 
observation – and no doubt an interesting one, for the courts‟ behaviour then would be an 
aberration, a deviation from established economic principles. 
So, in this sense, and I am happy to stand corrected, all that can be said by the economist 
on this matter, is that that is how things are. Based on the notion that economics is merely 
designed to explain how things are (and based on those observations, how things will be), 
one cannot I think, go much further than this. Economics would not, it seems, provide much 
room for finding disagreement with my view that the overall result of the wrongful birth cases 
is unsupportable, or just plain wrong. For the economist, to go further than that is surely to 
prefer an alternative solution, perhaps one based on economic principle. And if that view is 
not based on economic principle, it nevertheless still enters the terrain of normative analysis 
– but is informed by a “View from Somewhere Else” (whether this is one‟s gut feeling, own 
moral sense of the answer/how things should be, etc.).  
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So, this really outlines some of the initial questions that I have of the discipline of Law and 
Economics as applied to these wrongful birth cases - whether the ability to explain the 
courts‟ behaviour via economic reasoning in fact amounts to a defence and justification (i.e. 
condoning) the outcomes of these cases. For in the absence of an explicit assertion to the 
contrary, the analysis provided by Bruce would seem to suggest that the courts‟ approach is 
supportable, because it would appear to sit in accordance with economic principles. And 
importantly, if one does provide support for the British Courts‟ behaviour, I suggest that it is 
nigh impossible to claim that one is not concerned with value judgments, or the question of 
what should be. One is making a choice, forming a judgment as to what should be; the 
values that guide the economist then, of „efficiency-seeking‟ behaviour is an explicitly 
normative judgment. The economist is applying his own view as to what is socially desirable 
(i.e. efficiency), his own vision of social justice, and ignoring other ways of understanding the 
rationale underlying the development of the common law and so on.  
If this is so, then in my mind, much more in the way of a defence is required as to why 
efficiency ought to be the goal. It takes little imagination to consider how promoting 
„efficiency as the goal‟ could deliver an impoverished form of „justice‟, given that this will 
ignore (and tolerate), among other things, existing inequalities, vulnerability and hardship, 
and exercise of power in society. Indeed, as a case in point, though Bruce‟s analysis 
suggests that the wrongful birth cases are in line with economic principles, and he would 
presumably not seek to advocate a „different solution‟, given my analysis which highlights 
precisely these aspects of wrongful birth case law and finds them so terribly problematic, my 
response is very different.16  
It is worthwhile noting that none of this should be taken as an attack upon Law and 
Economics – instead, what I am outlining here (albeit, in non-exhaustive fashion) are 
aspects of a Law and Economics approach to the wrongful birth case law that I find to be 
troubling, in part unconvincing, but ultimately, fascinating. Indeed, had I not been so fixated 
upon the initial claims made in Bruce‟s paper, I would have spent the greater part of this 
paper engaging with points that I found to be both promising and useful. However, for the 
time being, I wish to get these preliminary points out of the way. So, as a means of teasing 
out a further address from Chris Bruce, one which will better allow me to understand the 
contribution that Law and Economics can make to my understanding of the development of 
the common law, I conclude this response with a number of concrete enquiries. 
Conclusion (Questions for Chris Bruce)  
What I seek to do here is to expose a series of my concerns in the form of posing a number 
of quite specific questions of the economic analysis of wrongful birth case law. Insofar as 
Chris Bruce‟s paper seeks to specifically address the wrongful birth case law, I would wish to 
see how the general thesis could be defended on the basis of the following queries:-  
In the section of his paper dealing with „testable hypotheses‟, Bruce notes that his prior 
analysis predicts that: 
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 For details as to the solution I would recommend, see my conclusion in my earlier piece in JLE, 
Priaulx, 2008.   
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If both the parents are not disabled and (a) the unplanned child is not 
disabled, the court will award either no damages or only conventional 
damages‟ whilst if the „unplanned child is disabled, the courts will award 
damages equal to those that would have been awarded if the child had not 
been disabled plus the incremental costs associated with raising a disabled 
child.  
My interest here is in how this position has been reached – that is the view that courts will 
award either no damages, or only conventional damages - on economic principles. Based on 
my reading of his analysis, the notion that courts are likely to award either no damages or 
only conventional damages in such an instance, would seem to be based upon an explicit 
value-judgment, or at least the analysis would seem to have been engineered in such a way 
as to reflect (rather than predict) the courts‟ view that the birth of an unwanted but healthy 
child is, in itself, a fairly minor harm (which should therefore not command much in the way 
of compensation).  
Let me break this down to three individual points for comment:-  
1. In the case of parents with an unwanted but healthy child, why would one 
factor in the probability of having a disabled child into the equation? Insofar as 
parents in these cases wished to avoid the birth of any child, I do not think it 
appropriate to measure the harm that they have suffered (and indeed to vary 
the compensation that should be awarded as a result) on the basis of a 
comparison between the small risk of having a child with a disability, and 
having a healthy child. Such an analysis, it would seem, merely starts from 
the position that the birth of a disabled child is a harmful occurrence best 
avoided, and that parents with a healthy child (albeit one that they didn‟t want) 
are extremely fortunate for having escaped that kind of child and having been 
blessed with a better, healthy one. In other words, how does one arrive at the 
conclusion objectively that the birth of a healthy child in such instances should 
command only a small amount of damages? Such an issue, it seems to me 
must necessarily be separated from the issue of wrongfully born disabled 
children.   
2. Following on from the above, there would seem to be a fair amount of 
speculation in arriving at this conclusion, which does not seem to be the 
product of a “positive scientific” approach. Bruce argues that while the 
average parent of an unwanted child must have suffered a net loss, this does 
not mean that such a parent must suffer a net loss when the unwanted child 
is not disabled. He suggests that, „it is possible that even though the parents 
of unwanted children expected to obtain lower net benefits from their children 
than did the parents of wanted children, they may still have expected to obtain 
positive net benefits from a healthy, but unwanted child.‟ It seems to me that 
the inclusion of the words „possible‟ and „may‟ is just as speculative and 
arbitrary as the view espoused in McFarlane, that the birth of a healthy child 
is a joy and a blessing, and not, on the whole, a harm. In other words, the 
analysis seems to be derived from the court‟s approach, and not predictive of 
the outcome.  
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3. Prior to McFarlane, the position of the courts was to award damages on the 
basis of full compensation. Naturally this approach would still, in relevant 
cases, have drawn a distinction between unwanted but healthy children and 
unwanted but disabled children. However, the difference between the post-
McFarlane approach and the pre-McFarlane approach is that in the latter, the 
repercussions of parenting an unwanted but healthy child were assumed to 
be the appropriate subject-matter of full compensation, including the costs of 
raising the child to majority. Was this position, which was held for thirteen 
years, not in line with economic principle? In other words, what on the basis 
of economic theory justifies this shift in compensation policy to a position 
where such parents will not receive child maintenance damages (but will 
receive a fixed conventional award)?  
 
And finally – it is useful to raise one further general point which explores these cases in the 
broader context of tort law as a whole. This, for me, is particularly critical. As we are more 
than aware, the principle of full compensation no longer applies to these specific actions 
(which have received „special treatment‟). Given how tort law does tort law, and the 
overarching objectives of tort law, my own interest is in what it is precisely that justifies the 
„special treatment‟, and whether an economist might form a view (or indeed, whether it could 
be predicted) as to whether the kind of solutions the courts have arrived at in the wrongful 
birth case, should have broader application. If „efficiency-seeking‟ behaviour on the part of 
the courts formed the explanation for this, then might we not expect to see the court depart 
from orthodox rules of tort law across the board in clinical negligence, and elsewhere?  
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